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I. INTRODUCTION
The arrival of the highly-touted "information age" may precipitate
a crisis for the United States if attention is not directed toward the im-
pact of rapidly-changing communications technology on the American
economy and society. Most discussions about the implications of the
information age have centered on specific problem areas-such as reg-
ulation of transborder data flows, allocation of radio frequencies and
deregulation of telecommunications services.' This Perspective, how-
ever, will attempt to provide a cohesive discussion by examining the
components of United States international communications and infor-
mation policy, demonstrating their interrelationships, and pinpointing
some of the implications of a failure to understand and harness the
"information genie." The scope of this examination must be interna-
* Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.
* Staff Director, Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives.
I See, e.g., Fishman, Introduction to Transborder Data Flows, 16 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1980);
Novotny, Transborder Data Flow Regulation: Technical Issues of Legal Concern, 3 COMPTrrER/
L.J. 105 (1981); Rice, Regulation of Direct Broadcast Satellites: International Constraints and Do-
mestic Options, N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 813 (1980); Rothblatt, Satellite Communications and Spectrum
Allocation, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1982); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, PUB. No. OTA-
CIT-163, RADIOFREQUENCY USE AND MANAGEMENT: IMPACTS FROM THE WORLD ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF 1979, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1982); MAJ. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION & FINANCE, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST. SESs., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE STATUS OF
COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1981).
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tional because information is not constrained by national borders.
Policymakers will be required to synthesize competing and comple-
mentary interests in order to develop coherent, rational and effective
policies that will promote United States interests at home and abroad.
Ultimately, however, a solution to the problems of the information age
will require an active partnership between the government and the pri-
vate sector.
The actors in the information arena include providers of financial
services,2 the news media,3 educators4 and telecommunications suppli-
ers.5 They organize, distribute, analyze and impart information ob-
tained from investigation, study and instruction, or enable others to do
so.
6 Their activities are influenced by policies dealing with trade,7 bi-
lateral and multilateral assistance,8 national security9 and technological
development." Coordination and cooperation among these disparate
entities is, of course, difficult to achieve. One solution would be to
place primary responsibility for monitoring areas of concern with the
State Department's Office of the Coordinator for International Com-
munications and Information Policy. 1 This office would draw together
government 12 and private sector participants for exchanges of ideas,
and would guide decisionmaking in order to develop "the" national
policy for international communications and information.
II. THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICES
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Until recently, information gathering has been a fairly time-con-
suming process because it was overwhelmingly manual in nature.
Communications has for centuries involved symbols engraved or
2 See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 4349 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
6 One writer has described information suppliers as those companies which "produce, dis-
tribute, store or process information as their main product or else supply others with the means for
doing so." Oettinger, Information Resources: Knowledge andPower in the 21st Century, Sci., July
4, 1980, at 191, 192.
7 See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
12 Government actors include the departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Commerce, Edu-
cation and Labor, independent agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission; and
other federal agencies such as the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Devel-
opment, the Central Intelligence Agency and other members of the intelligence community.
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printed on tangible media such as stone tablets and paper. While the
telegraph and the telephone provided ways to communicate quickly,
there existed no way to transmit instantly a written record of the infor-
mation communicated.' 3 Over the past twenty years, however, infor-
mation technologies-the machinery and methods by which
information is produced, processed, stored or transmitted-have enor-
mously increased the speed with which information is transmitted and
have made possible its transmission in new forms. 14
The United States' economy shows the effect of this revolution
from "industrial age" to "information age." No longer can it be said
that the United States has a "smokestack" economy. Approximately
thirteen percent of the United States workforce is still in manufactur-
ing.15 Recent government statistics confirm that service trades-of
which the information industry is a prime example-are now the domi-
nant component of the United States economy. 16 Information suppli-
ers include such seemingly disparate entities as news media institutions,
the data processing industry, the entertainment industry, the educa-
tional system, federal information institutions,' 7 the banking system,
the insurance industry, and legal services. No matter how these indus-
tries develop, process, transmit or store information-by the use of
books, magazines, newspapers, films, file cards, magnetic tapes, vide-
odiscs or silicon chips-the dominant characteristic of the new infor-
mation industries is that they are knowledge-intensive.
Accepting the advent of the information age is not nearly as diffi-
cult as finding a term which describes the technology in all its varia-
tions. Writers have coined several different terms for the information
13 A letter, for example, was a form of written communication, but could be "transmitted"
only by the means of transportation available at the time. Until the advent of computers linked by
telephone lines--and later, satellites-instantaneous transmittal of written messages was impossi-
ble. See Grossman, Data Communications, ELECTRONIC DESIGN, Sept. 1, 1977, at 86, 86; McDer-
mott, Modem Media, id at 98.
14 For example, a computer linked to Nexis and the New York Times Information Bank can
provide, in seconds, access to news articles printed years before. Miller, Information Please, and
Fast-Reporting's Revolution: Data Bases, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., Sept. 1983, at 51, 52.
15 These workers are distinguished "from those who manage or sell or account for the goods
made by others in firms labeled 'manufacturing."' Birch, Who Creates Jobs?, 65 PuB. INT. 3, 14
n.2 (1981).
16 Livingston, Observations on the Role 0/Services in International Trade, FLETCHER F., Win-
ter 1982, at 91, 92-94.
17 Such institutions range from the Department of State and agencies within the intelligence
community, which process information necessary to protect and promote national security, to the
Census Bureau, which organizes information of use to other federal agencies.
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revolution: "teleinformatics,"' 8 "informatics," 9 informatique,2 ° tMlkma-
tique,2 ' and "compunications. ' 22 Although these terms are not synony-
mous, they all express the convergence of information and
communications technologies, the common denominator of the infor-
mation revolution. 3 In addition, this Perspective's title uses a term
which is useful for purposes of discussing policy problems: "Interna-
tional communications and information policy" suggests the merger of
communications and information into one field of endeavor.24 This
struggle to define terms is offered, however, more to describe the prob-
lem than to settle on a term.
As mentioned above, the problems raised by the information age
have in the past been discussed in isolation. For example, transborder
data flows 25 have most commonly been discussed in relation to trade
18 Eger, The Global Phenomenon of Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
203, 204 (1981).
19 The Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics (IBI), formed under the auspices of the
United Nations, defines "informatics" as "the rational and systematic application of information
to economic, social and political development." INTERGOVERNMENTAL BUREAU FOR INFORMAT-
ics, IBI Doc. No. DG 1-04, INFORMATICS: ITS POLITICAL IMPACT 2 (1980). Note, however, that
the Barnhart Dictionary of New English defines "informatics" simply as "another name for infor-
mation science." BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEw ENGLISH SINCE 1963, at 224 (1st ed. 1973).
20 while the French term informatique translates into English as "informatics," it is generally
used to refer to data processing. See Stratte-McClure, French Telecommunications.- Digital Tech-
nology and the TNl matique Program, ScI. AM., Sept. 1980, at 25, 25 (advertising supplement).
21 The word "telematics" (in French, tTH.matique) has been coined to describe the "intercon-
nection between computers and telecommunications." S. NORA & A. MINC, L'INFORMATISATION
DE LA SOCIfiTti [REPORT ON THE COMPUTERIZATION OF SOCIETY] 4 (1978). The Nora-Minc re-
port was commissioned by the President of France in 1976 "to stimulate thinking on how the
computerization of society should be carried out." Id at xvii. The report developed the "tlma-
tique plan," which became France's blueprint for information policy as well as technology. See
also Stratte-McClure, supra note 20, at 25; Gillette, Telematics: The Integration of Computing and
Communications, COMPUTERWORLD EXTRA!, Mar. 18, 1981, at 33.
22 Oettinger, supra note 6, at 191. Oettinger coined the word "compunications" to describe the
merger of computers and communications. Id Nora and Minc make an interesting point about
the difference between "compunications" and tlmatique: "The fact that the American term
stresses the computer and ours the telecommunications aspect is not accidental. It expresses a set
of power relationships that in France give the upper hand to the latter." S. NoRA & A. MINC,
supra note 21, at 197 n.l.
23 One notable example of this convergence is the development of American Telephone and
Telegraph (AT&T), the "communications" giant. AT&T now has computer switching systems
that handle more communications traffic in a faster, more efficient manner than the mechanical
switching systems of just a few years ago. See S. KLEINFIELD, THE BIGGEST COMPANY ON
EARTH: A PROFILE OF AT&T 301 (1981).
24 Perhaps a more accurate word than "international" would be "transnational," because the
impacts of the new technologies are felt "across" ("trans") national boundaries rather than solely
"between" ("inter") nations.
25 Transborder data flows can be "broadly defined as the electronic movement of data be-
tween countries." Fishman, supra note 1, at 1.
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barriers or personal privacy protection.26 Discussions in the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
about the free flow of information and the New World Information
Order27 have concentrated on the philosophical struggle between those
nations that want to promote information flow and those nations that
consider restrictions on information flow, such as prior consent, to be
fundamentally important.28 When there is clear agreement on a sub-
ject's definition, "compartmentalized" discussions such as these may be
desirable and useful. But when, as here, there is no clear agreement on
definitions, discussions limited in scope may shed light only on the in-
terests of one group, while failing to deal with the obstacles presented
by related outside interests. Until the participants in the information
age regularly relate to each other, the progress made by any one group
will be haphazard, uncertain and ultimately unprofitable-or at least
considerably less profitable than it could be.
III. PARTICIPANTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE
A. The Financial Community
The financial community has traditionally consisted of banks, sav-
ings and loan institutions, credit card companies, economic and
econometric consulting firms, securities and investment institutions,
and other providers of financial services. Today, however, this "com-
munity" is owned and dominated by conglomerates whose original in-
terests had little to do with financial services.29 Another recent
26 See, e.g., Recommendations of the Council Governing the Protection of Privacy and Trans-
border Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doc. C(80)58 (Oct. 1, 1980); Schiller, Sources of pposition
to U.S. Information Supremacy, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY HANDBOOK 258 (J. Schement,
F. Gutierrez & M. Sirbu, eds. 1982); Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the
Transborder Flow ofInformation, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287 (1981). Yet, the need for free in-
formation flow across national boundaries also affects such matters as the ability of a nation to
conduct its diplomatic affairs, the ability to receive worldwide press coverage, and the ability to
develop an educational system.
27 According to one commentator, "under the NWIO [New World Information Order], the
LDCs [less developed countries] would have equal access to the world's store of knowledge and
other information resources and would control foreign media reporting from their countries."
Bortnick, International Information Flow: The Developing World Perspective, 14 CORNELL INT'L
LJ. 333, 344 (1981).
28 See, e.g., id at 345-48; Righter, Battle ofthe Bias, 34 FOREIGN POL'Y 121 (1979); Schiller,
supra note 26, at 266-70.
29 Sears, Roebuck and Company, for example, is the largest savings and loan holding com-
pany in the United States. CITIBANK, N.A., CONSUMER BANKING Quiz (on file in the Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. offices) [hereinafter cited as CONSUMER BANKING QUIZ]. If Sears were to be
ranked by size among commercial banking institutions, it would be the sixteenth in the nation. Id
Gulf+ Western Industries, Inc., not only owns a bank and a consumer finance company, but also
owns a major motion picture company. Id.
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development is the financial community's reliance on communication
and information technologies. In the 1800s, banks and stock markets
were both competitive and sensitive to economic change, but their reac-
tions were limited by relatively slow communications.3  As the tele-
communications industry developed, financial information traveled
faster, banks and stock markets grew, and their reaction time de-
creased.31 Today, most funds transfers and other financial transactions
are conducted via telecommunications connections: links between
communications satellites and data processing networks, which permit
long-distance access to stored data.32 Thus, the prevalence of electronic
funds transfers is one result of the information age. The spread of
United States banks overseas is another. Transactions which once took
days or hours now require only minutes or even seconds. As a result,
the dependence of the banking industry on telecommunications and
information technologies has become absolute. A failure of the bank-
ing telecommunications network would spell disaster not only for in-
dividual financial institutions, but also for their conglomerate parents
and the international community in which they participate.
Thus, while the Federal Reserve Act33 may govern the speed of
United States bank activities overseas,34 more important influences on
the financial community are policies governing the use of communica-
tion satellites. Yet regulation of satellites is not the preserve of the
financial community. Such issues are discussed bilaterally and multi-
laterally by governments, as well as by the private sector, in the con-
texts of trade, economic assistance to developing nations, public
30 See Smith, The Wiring of Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 44.
31 For example,
[flifteen years ago, the New York Stock Exchange had to close down one day a week under
the pressure of trading 11 million shares a day. Next month, the Big Board expects the split
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company into eight companies to add, for a pe-riod of several months, about 15 million shares to a daily trading volume that often reaches
100 million shares. Along with the huge volume has come unprecedented volatility. Com-
puter technology gives money managers instant access to vast arrays of trading data. And
with such advances as the 40-button telephone-computer console, traders can now sweep
hundreds of millions of dollars out of one group of stocks and into another in a matter of
minutes.
Id at 46.
32 Indeed, with the new technology, individuals can now use personal computers to trade
stocks-and soon, to handle banking transactions-from the home. Id at 109. This will revolu-
tionize the financial community further. As Walter B. Wriston, chairman of Citicorp, noted:
What will be the value of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange or a brick-and-mortar
bank branch in an environment where every home has access to the Dow Jones and its bank
accounts simultaneously? In this kind of world, electronics become money, credit, securities
or savings and are more real than places.
Id
33 Ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
34 Id at §§ 601-604 & 611-632.
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diplomacy, restrictions on transborder data flows, news media interests,
and satellite systems development. How, then, can the financial com-
munity enter into such discussions?
B. The News Media
Another participant in the information age is the news industry,
which includes television, radio, newspapers, magazines, newsletters,
wire services, and other broadcast and print media. Over the years,
United States news media institutions have expanded overseas and de-
veloped publications tailored to international audiences. The Interna-
tional Herald Tribune and Newsweek International are typical
examples. These publications cater to the international elite: govern-
ment leaders, diplomats, business executives and other decisionmakers.
One positive effect of this information flow is that it facilitates interna-
tional negotiations, because diplomats often share common sources of
information. News media entities have also expanded beyond their
traditional fora. The Reuters wire service, for example, has installed
video display terminals at banks and exchanges around the world,
thereby creating a global trading network independent of traditional
financial institutions.35 The New York Times Company not only owns
various newspapers, but also has developed a cable communications
network and the New York Times Information Bank, a comprehensive
news data bank.36
The success of news media operations, however, depends not only
on the ability of journalists to communicate within the industry via
telecommunications networks, but also on their unhindered freedom to
discover and report the news. Some nations impair media operations
by requiring journalists to be licensed or accredited, by denying their
visas, or by requiring prior consent for the publication or broadcast of
information.37 Such hindrances are prohibited in the United States by
35 Reuters' Monitor service provides information about "the foreign exchange, money, com-
modities and shipping markets." Bulkeley, Electronic Gear Aims to Help Folks Cope With Data
Deluge, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1981, § 2, at 25, col. 1; CONSUMER BANKING Quiz, supra note 29.
36 See Times Buys 2 Cable TV Companies, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1980, at 24, col. 6; Times Offers
Data Service, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1981, at D2, col. 5.
37 For a discussion of ways in which host nations harass or manipulate foreign correspon-
dents, see, e.g., Buie, et al., Foreign Governments Are Playing Our Press, WASH. JOURNALISM REV.,
Oct. 1983, at 21.
For a discussion of government ownership of news media in various nations, see GLOBAL
JOURNALISM: A SURVEY OF THE WORLD'S MASS MEDIA (J. Merrill ed. 1983) at 29-34 (discussing
governments and journalism generally), 81-107 (discussing government ownership and control of
the news media in Soviet bloc nations).
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the first amendment,38 which guarantees freedom of speech and the
press.39 The few words of that amendment express values cherished by
citizens of the United States. These values ultimately control United
States policy judgments in all areas of the information arena. From the
United States' point of view, not only do these values encourage the
free flow of information upon which the news media depend for their
livelihood, but the importance of these democratic values justifies dip-
lomatic efforts to encourage other nations to adopt them.
Yet protecting the media's freedom abroad is a challenge, because
the international community generally is not receptive to the demo-
cratic value of free information flow. Disputes in UNESCO and other
international fora over issues related to the Third World concept of a
New World Information Order also indicate this lack of receptivity.4"
Some governments use many other domestic censorship methods which
are designed to restrict the flow of information to Western news media.
Such methods include harassment of foreign reporters, monopolies
granted to state-owned news media, denial of visas to foreign corre-
spondents, and excessive hospitality through carefully supervised tours
and access to "approved" news sources.41 Even more insidious is self-
censorship, which can result from the harassment or threat of expulsion
of journalists.
One way for developing nations to hasten their development is to
unify their populations by building a communications infrastructure.
This task is the challenge presented by the New World Information
Order.42 The desire of developing nations to expand and modernize
38 U.S. CONsT. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... "
39 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("The general proposi-
tion that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long
been settled by our decisions.").
40 For example, the debate over government control of the press was fueled when in 1976 the
Soviet Union introduced to the UNESCO General Assembly a draft Declaration on Mass Media.
That Declaration, and a later revised version, restated the principles enconpassed by the New
World Information Order. Bortnick, supra note 27, at 345-46. Resolutions passed by the mem-
bers of the IBI also demonstrated a willingness to regulate transborder data flows in order to
protect "national sovereignty, cultural identity and technological progress." International Data
Fow:- Hearings Before a Subcomm of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5-8 (1980).
41 See supra note 37.
42 According to one commentator,
[t]he NWIO promotes these broader concerns by emphasizing the need to achieve a balance
between developed and developing nations that will enable the LDCs to become active par-
ticipants in the world marketplace and partners in an increasingly interdependent world. The
LDCs view this balance not simply in terms of the news media, but equally in terms of access
to scientific and technical information, telecommunications facilities, and the distribution of
the frequency spectrum.
Bortnick, supra note 27, at 344-45.
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their communications systems and news reporting certainly is consis-
tent with the United States' democratic values and merits the United
States' support. The danger to free press, however, is that some nations
believe that the goal of improving news communications should in-
volve repression of the independent Western news media. The solution
may be for the news industry to assist in training foreign journalists
and to provide technical expertise to developing nations. Only when
the developing world has the ability to compete in the information age
will it recognize the strength and utility of the democratic values which
the United States seeks to encourage.
Other challenges to the news industry will be presented by the new
technological changes which affect its operations. In the near future,
depending on the speed and direction of development, citizens of the
United States and other nations will be able to select news, cultural
entertainment and scholarship from sources around the world by acces-
sing information networks with personal computers. But, what kind of
information will be available through this worldwide network and who
will choose the content and control the transmissions? What is the dif-
ference between "cultural entertainment" and "cultural pollution," and
who decides? How can the news media engage in such discussions?
C. The Education Community
A third participant in the information age is the education com-
munity. Including both teaching and research institutions, the educa-
tion community encompasses primary and secondary schools, colleges,
universities, training centers, rehabilitation centers, research and devel-
opment institutions, think tanks, foundations, technical institutes, as-
sociations, and libraries.
The education community is at the heart of the information
revolution. The development of new technologies will produce rational
and positive progress only if people can put the technologies to use and
adapt to new patterns of living. The information revolution is con-
stantly and rapidly changing what individuals must know and what
skills they need to participate fully in society. The information age is
partly an education age, for only with lifelong education and training
will individuals be able to adapt and adjust.
To meet this need, profit-making institutions are entering what
was traditionally the not-for-profit education market. For-profit corpo-
rations both provide on-the-job training and urge employees to obtain
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advanced education at company expense. The resources of these cor-
porations often far exceed those of the not-for-profit education commu-
nity, thereby helping to improve the overall educational level of United
States citizens today.4 3
Still, there remain numerous examples of the education commu-
nity's inability to provide needed training. In 1959, there were ninety-
six nations in the world' and the United States was the dominant force
in the international community. Today, there are 167 nations45 and the
United States is no longer the sole dominant force. Yet in the 1970s,
the study of foreign languages in the United States declined steadily.46
This decline has led to a lowered awareness of the rest of the world.47
A former director of the Central Intelligence Agency voiced concern
that the downgrading of "international" education in the United States
is threatening both recruitment efforts and the competence of employ-
ees in the foreign policy and intelligence fields. 48 A new term, "func-
tional illiteracy," has been coined to describe the problems plaguing an
education system which is producing citizens not even capable of shop-
ping for groceries or performing simple arithmetic. 49 Yet the informa-
tion age requires a new kind of literacy, which includes an
understanding of technology. In the face of such challenges, how can
the education community begin to find a solution?
D. International Telecommunications Organizations
Telecommunication, which literally means "communication at a
distance," 50 is defined in the International Telecommunication Con-
vention as "[a]ny transmission, emission or reception of signs, signals,
writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wires, ra-
dio, optical or other electromagnetic systems." 51 The telecommunica-
tions industry has traditionally included entities engaged in electrical
43 See, ag., Teltsch, Noncash Giving on Rise to Needy Organizations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1982, at A2, col. 1 (corporate gifts of property increasing); Corporate Philanthropy, Id, May 18,
1982, at D6, col. 5 (survey shows greater willingness by corporations to make charitable gifts).
44 BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATUS OF THE
VORLD'S NATIONS 1 (1983).
45 Id.
46 The Editorial Notebook Why Johnny Isn't Learning French, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1978, at
26, col. 1 (federally funded foreign language program in elementary schools is dying out).
47 Id
48 The Future of International Education" Hearings Before the SubcomnL on International Oper-
ations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 417 (1978).
49 P. IRWIN, ADULT LITERACY: PROBLEMS AND ALTERNATIVES 3 (Congressional Research
Service 1983).
50 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1198 (1977).
51 International Telecommunication Convention, Malaga-Torremolinos, Jan. 1, 1973, 28
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transmission of information by telegraphy, telephony, radio and
television.
For a century, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
has been the focal point for the international regulation of telecommu-
nications.52 Its purpose is to enable the domestic and international
telecommunications services of each nation to develop effectively with-
out interfering with other nations' services.53 The ITU has established
standards and practices to govern telecommunications equipment, op-
erations and tariffs,54 and has provided a clearinghouse for the coordi-
nation, exchange and publication of technical information for the
planning and operation of services.55
The ITU today is facing the same disruptions felt in other areas
because of the blurring of traditional distinctions between telecommu-
nications and computer technologies. At the same time, dependence on
telecommunications to achieve national and international objectives,
especially peace among nations, has increased substantially. For exam-
ple, earth exploration satellites now use remote sensing to survey re-
sources, forecast crops and provide meteorological data.56
Sophisticated aircraft navigation with the use of satellites increases the
safety of air transportation. 57  As the uses of data communication in-
crease, the pressures to allocate frequencies in a finite electromagnetic
spectrum will mount.58 Those nations such as the United States, which
now have the capability to use much of the frequency spectrum, are
being pressured by developing nations for their "place in the spec-
trum," even though these nations are not yet ready to use some fre-
U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572, Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference, Ge-
neva, 1979, Radio Regulations, art. Ni/i, § 1.2.
52 The ITU was formed in 1934, as a result of a merger between the International Telegraph
Union (created in 1865) and other unions. Rutkowski, United States Policymakingfor the Public
International Forums on Communication, 8 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 95, 98 n.l (1980).
53 International Telecommunication Convention, supra note 51, at art. 4, § 1:
The purposes of the Union are:
(a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and ra-
tional use of telecommunications of all kinds;
(b) to promote the development of technical facilities and their most efficient opera-
tion WU a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunications services, increasing
their usefulness and making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;
(c) to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
54 Rutkowski, supra note 52, at 102.
55 Id
56 McDermott, supra note 13, at 98, 102-03.
57 SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, UNITED
STATES CIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAMS 350-52 (1983).
58 M. SMITH, THE 1979 WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR FUTURE ITU CONFERENCES AND SPACE SERVICES 23 (Congressional
Research Service 1981).
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quencies or, as a result of technological advancements, may never use
them. 9 Because the frequency spectrum is finite, the ITU's job of gov-
erning the allocation system will be increasingly difficult.
The ITU's decisions regarding standards and tariffs also affect
other communications issues discussed in UNESCO and the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), such as
regulation of transborder data flows and free information flow gener-
ally.61 Yet, very little has been done to relate these discussions to one
another or to discussions in other international fora, such as the United
Nations Outer Space Committee, where other related issues are de-
bated. For example, one of the issues at the ITU Plenipotentiary Con-
ference which concluded on November 4, 1982,61 concerned the extent
to which the ITU should provide technical assistance to developing na-
tions for telecommunications projects. 62 But no such decision should
be made without also considering the bilateral and multilateral assist-
ance already provided by individual nations, the private sector,
UNESCO, the United Nations Development Program,63 and other in-
ternational entities.
These communications and information issues must be balanced
against conflicting national needs of sovereignty and dependence. As
technology becomes more sophisticated and the interdependence of na-
tions increases, tensions will mount unless ways are found to balance
interests and treat all nations fairly.
5 9 
.Id at 34-41.
60 See, e.g., Markoski, supra note 26, and the examples therein of how decisions by the ITU's
International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee.(CCIT1) can affect the provision
of international telecommunications services.
61 For a description of the 1982 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, see Gardner, U.S. Should
Lookfor "Compatible Alternatives" to ITU, COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, Nov. 17, 1982, at 1, 1-5.
62 Nairobi Meeting a Disappointmentfor U.S. Team, BROADCASTING, Nov. 15, 1982, at 38.
63 The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was established in 1966 when two
existing U.N. technical assistance programs were merged in an effort to improve the coordination
and effectiveness of U.N. technical aid activities. The UNDP's primary objective is to provide
systematic and coordinated assistance for technical, economic and social development throughout
the world, emphasizing programs in the poorest nations. The UNDP receives funding from the
voluntary contributions of more than 144 governments. It is responsible for the coordination of
all U.N. grant technical assistance, while relying on the U.N. and its specialized agencies to imple-
ment most of its projects. UNDP-sponsored programs provide more than $550 million annually
in technical aid and other activities for 150 countries. See DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COM-
MITTEE, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT IssuES: U.S.
ACTIONS AFFECTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE 153a-156.
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E The International Trading Community
If communications and information are the lifelines of the world,
then international trade is its lifeblood. The information revolution
has affected general trade by enabling commercial activities to be con-
ducted more rapidly and efficiently. In addition, trade in information-
processing products-computers, terminals, software and related
equipment-has increased faster than almost any other trade sector. A
recent report estimates that the local market for such products was $73
billion in 1981, and predicts that revenues will reach $125 billion to
$150 billion in 1986 and $190 billion to $230 billion in 1991.14 The
report also estimates that the United States market, with a current
value of approximately $36 billion, or half of total world revenues, will
grow at the world rate over the next five years.65 From 1986 to 1991,
however, the value of the United States market will increase by an av-
erage of approximately eleven percent, while the rest of the world's
market will average a growth rate of approximately nine percent. 6
This growth in trade has broad implications. Increased trade
means more jobs, but may require labor force retraining; consequently,
as the information age revolutionizes the workplace, the impact of in-
formation technology on employment levels will become a concern.
Should business retrain present workers, or simply replace "obsolete"
workers? Should tax-deductible depreciation allowances similar to
those now given for plant and equipment be developed for the labor
force? Who should bear the costs--society as a whole, the business
community, or the individual?
The information age will affect international trade in other ways as
well. The challenge now for United States industry is to design, pro-
duce, market and distribute communications products and services,
thereby reinforcing the United States' economic, political, social and
cultural advantage. If it fails, the United States will find itself in the
position of being a consumer of these products and debtor to those
countries who produce them. Information technologies are growing
rapidly under government impetus in countries such as Japan and
France,67 and the resulting competition with the United States is a
64 World Marketfor Information Processing Products to Double in 5 Years, INTELTRADE,
May 15 & 30, 1982, at 1, 1.
65 Id at 2.
66 Id
67 Indeed, the competition from Japan can be felt throughout the Western Hemisphere:
Latin America is being incorporated into the strategies by which Japanese companies plan to
grow. Meanwhile, Latin Americans are gaining the resources and skills necessary to make
use of the new technologies. All this is made possible by the continual forward movement of
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threat which must be met with more than rhetoric.
This is an area in which the United States government could play
a central role as catalyst and risk spreader. One example is trade in
microelectronics. Within that industry are three identifiable compo-
nents: the silicon chip, which is the brain of the system; the software,
which programs the system; and the device itself, into which the chip is
incorporated. The United States must decide whether to seek self-suffi-
ciency in the whole technology, or whether to specialize in one compo-
nent and rely on the international market to supply the rest. On the
one hand, self-sufficiency provides an integrated industry and a psy-
chological feeling of control, but it requires substantial investment and
a long lead time for research and development. On the other hand,
specialization may cost less in time and money, but its success depends
on the reliability of the international marketplace to supply compatible
components. Such decisions cannot be left to chance; meanwhile, other
nations are not spending time in contemplation.68
Furthermore, the partnership in the trading sector between gov-
ernment and business has never been adequately developed in the
United States. Unless some way is found to promote investment in
information technologies-through a working partnership consisting of
business, labor and government-the United States stands to lose more
than just a trade advantage. But, how will this partnership evolve?
When will business, labor and government engage in the discussions
necessary to bring it about?
Japanese industry. Collaborating with the government, Japanese companies are willing to
discard older technologies as fast as newer ones can be developed, while financing the devel-
opment of the new technologies by gaining strong and sometimes dominant positions in the
world market for older ones. Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund provides very
low-interest loans to Latin Americans to finance large technological purchases .... Japan's
tax laws provide additional incentives for technological transfer. And Japan provides its
companies with generous insurance against foreign losses.
Reich, Hi-Tech Wafare: Fixated on Russia, We Risk Losing to Japan, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 1,
1982, at 17, 19. See also Stratte-McClure, supra note 20.
68 As one journalist noted:
Today no one holds a commanding lead in the technological race. The United States remains
respectably ahead in pure research and high-tech applications for defense and aerospace.
Britain and France have entered the "information age" several steps ahead of the Japanese
with their innovative videotex systems. But Japan has virtually wiped out international com-
petition in consumer electronics-and its manufacturers have taken dead aim at the global
office-automation market. The country is also a leader in robotics and optical electronics.
And Japanese industry is rapidly closing the gap with the United States in computers, semi-
conductors and genetic engineering. Perhaps more important, Japanese firms are now the
world's undisputed masters of manufacturing technology-the science of how to make prod-
ucts more efficiently--and they are using that know-how to make older businesses more
competitive.
Japan's High-Tech Challenge, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 9, 1982, at 48, 48.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 5:486(1983)
F Bilateral and Multilateral Assistance Organizations
A communications infrastructure is central to any nation's ability
to conduct its internal affairs. Developing such an infrastructure can
require anything from building a telecommunications system which
provides telephone and telegraph facilities, to training journalists and
technicians, to building roads which connect villages and towns. Al-
though information technologies have flourished in some nations, the
needs of other nations remain unmet.69
In the effort to assist the developing world to become equal part-
ners in the international community, the United States developed a bi-
lateral development assistance program70 and, in 1961, formalized it by
enacting the Foreign Assistance Act.71 The Agency for International
Development (AID) is charged with running United States bilateral
assistance programs.72 This assistance, however, has been provided in
a haphazard and unfocused way. While development assistance pro-
grams are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act, AID as an entity
has no enabling legislation to provide it with a life of its own apart
from its programs. The agency depends on annual authorizations and
appropriations for its very existence.73 In addition, AID's fundamental
69 According to one report:
Despite the huge investments being made in telecommunications to meet pent-up demand for
service, one-third of the countries in the world still have fewer than one phone per 100 people
and less than 50,000 phones in service. Only a dozen countries have more than 5 million
phones, and half of those countries have not yet achieved a 30% density of telephones. Less
than 20% of the countries outside of North America have more than 15 phones per 100
people.
ARTHUR D. LIrrLa, INC., WORLD TELECOMMUNICATIONS STUDY II, 1980-1990: A SUMMARY 3
(1980). See also Bortnick, supra note 27, at 335-36.
70 For information on the history of the U.S. bilateral assistance effort, see D. MICKELWAIT, C.
SwEET & E. MoRss, NEw DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF U.S. AID (1979).
71 Pub. L. No. 87-329, 75 Stat. 719 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2443 (1982)).
72 Established in 1961 pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, AID is the principal
U.S. government agency designated to carry out bilateral economic assistance programs in the
Third World. Pub. L. No. 87-195, § 621, 75 Stat. 424, 445 (1961). AID administers programs
under two general categories: development aid, which is intended to meet long-term development
needs of the world's poorest populations; and economic support funds, which are designed to
provide fast-disbursing economic aid to achieve political and economic stabililty in areas where
the United States has special security and political interests. In 1979, the International Develop-
ment Cooperation Agency (IDCA) was established by the Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979, 3
C.F.R. 510 (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1168-69 (1982) and in 93 Stat. 1378 (1979), to
coordinate all U.S. economic activities with the Third World. AID became a component of
IDCA, and its administrator reports to the director of IDCA and the President. 3 C.F.R. at 511; 5
U.S.C. app. at 1169. At the present time, however, Peter McPherson is serving as both the admin-
istrator for AID and the acting director of IDCA.
73 Although the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 directed the President to establish an agency
to carry out U.S. economic aid programs, the 1961 Act, § 622(c), 75 Stat. at 446, also made the
Secretary of State responsible for the supervision and general direction of U.S. economic and
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mandate has been to address basic human needs.74 As a result, the
agency has been discouraged over the years from providing the funds
to build infrastructures such as roads and communications facilities.
Yet if a nation has no communications infrastructure, how can its peo-
ple take their goods to market or even find out where the markets are?
Thus, to be truly effective, assistance to the "poorest of the poor" must
include the building of infrastructures.
Multilateral assistance has for some years also been provided
through the United Nations, multilateral financial institutions, and re-
gional organizations. Because of the efforts of the United Nations De-
velopment Program and United Nations Specialized Agencies such as
UNESCO, the World Health Organization and the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, a great deal of assistance has been provided to de-
veloping nations.75 In addition, multilateral assistance has been
provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (the World Bank) and its soft loan window, the International De-
velopment Association, the International Monetary Fund, and regional
multilateral banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank and
military aid programs. By making AID a part of the State Department rather than an independ-
ent agency, lawmakers felt that economic aid programs could be better coordinated with general
U.S. foreign policy objectives and more effectively integrated with other U.S. activities overseas.
S. REP. No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2472,
2507-08.
74 The phrase "basic human needs" first appeared in U.S. economic assistance legislation in
1978, when Congress modified the existing objectives of U.S. development assistance policy de-
scribed in § 102, 75 Stat. at 424, of the Foreign Assistance Act. The basic human needs approach
represented a further evolution of the "New Directions" policy instituted by Congress in 1973.
John J. Gilligan, chairman of the Development Coordination Committee and administrator of
AID during the Carter administration, defined "basic human needs" as "the objective of develop-
ment .... [It] is a growth strategy which emphasizes the beneficiaries of economic growth and
stresses broadly based increases in productivity of human resources." DEVELOPMENT COORDINA-
TION COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT IS-
suEs: U.S. ACTIONS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE 21 (1979). He later stated
that the basic human needs strategy "focuses on the production and supply of adequate quantities
of basic goods and services and on the access of the poor to those goods and services through
increases in employment and income." DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE, DEVELOP-
MENT ISSUES: U.S. ACTIONS AFFECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES,
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 23 (1978). There is, however, some disagreement
about precisely what needs are basic and how to assign priorities to those needs.
75 Since the 1950s, UNDP and other U.N. organizations have provided more than $7.7 billion
in economic assistance to developing countries. These institutions have steadily increased the
amount of aid they provide, particularly during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and assistance
reached a peak in 1982 when they provided nearly $800 million. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS AND ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS, THE 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DEVELOPMENT COORDI-
NATION COMMITTEE, STATISTICAL ANNEx 1 (July 1, 1945-Sept. 30, 1982) 191.
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the Asian Development Bank.76 Finally, regional multilateral entities
such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for
African Unity have provided assistance for their respective regions."
An aid program, especially in telecommunications, ideally should
be planned to account for the bilateral efforts of individual countries,
multilateral efforts by the international community, and the trade pic-
ture for that developing nation. In order to avoid duplication, comple-
mentary assistance programs could be planned by individual nations,
multilateral organizations and private business entities. To a degree,
this does happen today. The United States, however, does not organize
and oversee its participation in bilateral and multilateral assistance
programs with any consistency. Further compounding this problem is
that trade's impact on aid (and vice versa) has not been thoroughly
studied or anticipated.78
The communications and information revolution is exacerbating
the development gap between the rich and poor nations of the world.
Developing nations' attempts to redress the imbalance through support
for a New World Information Order and a New International Eco-
nomic Order 9 are evidence of this gap. The information age promises
to solve many of the problems of the developing world, but also threat-
ens to increase the tensions between the industrialized and developing
nations. Unfortunately, each country's stages of development may
vary so no one plan will work for all. Ways must be found to lessen
these tensions and encourage the developing world's participation in
this new age. But, how can bilateral and multilateral assistance organi-
zations bring this about?
G. National Security Agencies
In its broadest sense, United States national security could involve
any activity or interest designed to promote and protect this country's
76 For specific levels of assistance from these multilateral institutions to individual countries,
see ld at 191-238.
77 For a description of the activities and functions of these organizations, see I THE EUROPA
YEARBOOK 1983: A WORLD SURVEY 247-56.
78 Note, however, that the Foreign Assistance Act does recognize the need for such coordina-
tion. Section 601(b)(1), 75 Stat. at 438, states that the President shall "make arrangements to find,
and draw the attention of private enterprise to, opportunities for investment and development in
less-developed friendly countries and areas." 22 U.S.C. § 2351(b)(1) (1982). See also FOREIGN
AFFAmS & NATL DEFENSE DiVIsION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 96TH CONG., lST
SESS., ISSUES AND OPTIONS IN THE COORDINATION OF U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY: REPORT PRE-
PARED FOR THE HousE FOREIGN AFFAIRS Comm. 9 (Comm. Print 1979).
79 See, ag., Cooper, 4 New International Economic Orderfor Mutual Gain, 26 FOR. POL'Y 66
(1977); Ward, Another Chancefor the North?, 59 FOR. AFFAIRS 386 (1980-81).
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national interests. The term is used here, however, to describe those
activities which affect United States governmental relations with other
nations. In this sense, the United States national security network in-
cludes the departments of State and Defense, the United States Infor-
mation Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, AID, and
the intelligence agencies. The network uses foreign policy, public di-
plomacy, defense policy and intelligence gathering to protect the
United States in the international community. Information and com-
munications form the core of this network.
The information age, by changing both the character and content
of United States international relationships, has challenged the State
Department to rethink its traditional approach to diplomacy. The
State Department has 283 posts overseas and runs the farthest-flung
empire in the world, although it is the smallest cabinet-level depart-
ment of the United States government. 81 In 1959, when there were
ninety-four nations in the world, the State Department employed ap-
proximately 22,920 people.81 In 1983, with 167 nations on the planet,
the State Department only employs approximately 23,961 people.82 At
the same time, the Department's responsibilities have increased astro-
nomically due to the increase in the number of nations with whom the
United States maintains diplomatic relations and a substantial increase
over the past decade in the number of Americans traveling abroad.
The Department has made great strides in improving its techno-
logical capabilities in data processing and communications,83 no mean
feat when accurate, rapid and stable communications are required not
only in large posts like London and Tokyo, in stable, industrial socie-
ties, but also in small posts in out-of-the-way places in the developing
world, where the electricity fails regularly and a trip to a village a few
miles from the capital takes five hours of rugged driving over dirt roads
often washed out by heavy rains. The Department, however, still has
not developed a plan for ensuring that members of the career Foreign
Service understand the implications of the information age discussed
above. The core of an effective foreign policy is information about the




83 For example, on February 16, 1983, the State Department inaugurated a new era in over-
seas communications by transmitting from a computer in the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, Federal
Republic of Germany, to the Department in Washington, D.C., the first operational telegram
prepared and transmitted electronically without generating any paper. Bureau of Administration,
Department of State, Cable No. 03950, Bonn, Feb. 16, 1983.
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needs, desires, plans and activities of other nations and international
organizations; this information must be collected and analyzed by For-
eign Service members trained for that purpose. The failure to recog-
nize the challenges of the information age will impair the Foreign
Service, and with it, the ability of the United States to develop and
coordinate coherent, rational and effective foreign policy responses.
Public diplomacy, or communicating a country's goals and ideals
to the rest of the world, is another important aspect of United States
foreign policy. Because it is the means by which governments seek to
influence world opinion, public diplomacy depends heavily on the ac-
curacy and reliability of information technologies. In the United
States, public diplomacy affects the activities of many segments of soci-
ety: the news media, the education community, the trade and assist-
ance sectors, as well as national security.
The government agency primarily responsible for the United
States' public diplomacy efforts is the United States Information
Agency (USIA). Through its international education programming, its
international exchanges of information, and the Voice of America
broadcasts, USIA tells the world about the United States and tells the
United States about the world.84 A second public diplomacy agency,
the Board for International Broadcasting, oversees Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty, which broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union respectively. The broadcasts, which rely on impressive research
services, stress local news. They reach tens of millions- of people in the
Soviet Union (with broadcasts in fifteen languages) and the Commu-
nist bloc nations.85 These public diplomacy tools are intended to influ-
ence public opinion abroad by providing access to a wider body of facts
and information than would otherwise be available. They are not or-
gans of propaganda in the pejorative sense, implying a sinister and de-
ceitful intent to ram "the American dream" or the United States
position on a particular issue down the throats of a given audience.
Instead, they are designed to permit independent thought and to en-
courage democratic values.
Unfortunately, as adept as the United States has been in develop-
ing information technologies and in harnessing communications, it has
failed to communicate effectively with the world at large. Modern in-
formation technologies are central to effective public diplomacy, yet the
Voice of America still operates in Munich with a vintage 1942 transmit-
84 See Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, 13 WEEKLY
COmp. PREs. Doc. 1519 (Oct. 11, 1977) (President Jimmy Carter).
85 BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 1982 4.
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ter.8 6 The USIA, which has a mandate to develop and execute a com-
prehensive national policy regarding international communications,
8 7
has been consistently underfunded and denied sufficient personnel.88
International exchange programs have targeted the elites in each coun-
try at the expense of programs for the youth who will be tomorrow's
leaders and decisionmakers. Although USIA is itself affected by the
debate over a New World Information Order, no real plans have been
made to provide training and technical expertise through USIA
programs.
AID is another part of the foreign policy network. As has been
discussed earlier,89 effective bilateral assistance as a component of for-
eign policy raises questions about AID's ability to meet the challenges
of the information age. The "basic human needs" approach to bilateral
assistance fails to recognize that information is a basic human need. In
the past, neither AID nor the multilateral development banks have
generally regarded communications investments as integral to eco-
nomic development. In order for United States foreign policy to reflect
the realities of the information age and this country's national security
needs, however, this attitude must change.
Yet another participant in this process is the intelligence commu-
nity, which uses, analyzes and produces information. Intelligence-
gathering depends on information technologies, and has been altered
radically by the advent of the new information systems. From the use
of sophisticated data processing systems to organize, store and retrieve
information 90 to the use of reconnaissance satellites and other elec-
tronic data-gathering methods to collect and analyze information
around the world,91 the intelligence community has a vital stake in the
information revolution. As one writer noted, sophisticated new infor-
mation technologies "have given the American intelligence community
an unsurpassed capacity to peel away the layers of secrecy that have
86 See Tomlinson, America's Sttied Voice, Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1983, at C7, col 4.
87 Memorandum from the President of the United States to the Director of the U.S. Interna-
tional Communication Agency, Mar. 13, 1978.
88 Recently, some progress has been made by providing funding for a major modernization
and expansion of the agency's facilities in the fiscal year 1984-85 authorization for the State De-
partment, USIA and BIB. Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 202, 97 Stat. 1017 (1983). See also H. R. REP.
No. 130, infra note 99.
89 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
90 For a discussion of the importance of information technology to intelligence-gathering, see
Burt, Technology is Essential to Arms Verfftcation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at Cl, col. 5.
91 1d
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traditionally surrounded the Soviet Union's military establishment."'92
The final component of the national security network is the De-
partment of Defense, which runs the largest communications network
in the world. Clearly, its stake in the information revolution is funda-
mental to its successful development of defense and military policies.
Without the ability to gather and analyze information and maintain
communications with planes, ships, submarines and United States mili-
tary installations around the world, the United States defense network
would collapse. Thus, the Defense Department is interested in the de-
velopment of information technologies, the politics of frequency as-
signments and satellite use, the development of security assistance
programs, and the training of Americans in international affairs. Yet,
how can the Defense Department and the other components of the na-
tional security network ensure that their interests are addressed in any
discussions about these aspects of the information age?
H Suppliers and Users of the New Information Technologies
Information technology encompasses the methods and devices
used to process, store and transmit information. The "brain" of an in-
formation system is the silicon chip. Together with electronic storage
devices, chips can be linked through telecommunications networks,
thus enormously increasing the number of people who can have access
to information.9 3 Personal computers that can access data bases are
one example.94 Other examples are data and word processors which, if
92 Id Photo reconnaissance satellites are one example of the benefits the new technologies
have brought to U.S. intelligence-gathering activities:
A hundred miles above central Asia, an American satellite suddenly switches into operation.
Although it is the dead of night, the spacecraft's camera takes hundreds of photographs of a
suspicious construction site near a Soviet inter-continental ballistic missile complex. Minutes
later, as the satellite passes over Australia, the infrared photos are transmitted to an Ameri-
can-operated ground station and then relayed to the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley,
Va.
Examining the heat-sensitive images with the aid of computers using photo enhancement
techniques developed in planetary exploration, C.I.A. analysts quickly note that the ground
temperature of the construction site is substantially warmer than the surrounding terrain.
The evidence appears conclusive: The Russians have secretly begun building an under-
ground silo in which to house a new, multi-warhead missile.
Id
93 See Grossman, supra note 13, at 89-92.
94 For example, the U.S. House of Representatives has developed the House Information Sys-
tems operation to provide computer capacity to individual members of Congress and congres-
sional committees. This Perspective was written on a VT 102 Digital Equipment Corporation
word processor, which can access various data banks, including SCORPIO and LEGIS. The for-
mer is the data bank of the Library of Congress and provides access to sources such as bibliogra-
phies, information about national organizations, an index of Library of Congress materials, and
Congressional Record abstracts. The House Information Network LEGIS provides, for example,
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interconnected throughout a company's or organization's offices, en-
hance efficiency, productivity, morale and profits.95
The new information technologies present almost limitless pos-
sibilities for growth, but also present a host of problems. One problem
is computer fraud, a new variation on a very old crime. Another prob-
lem, one with which the legal profession is grappling, is the industrial-
age concept of privacy protection.9 6 For example, information technol-
ogies enable corporations to transmit general business information
while simultaneously transmitting information about individuals which
may be subject to privacy protections.97 Moreover, excitement about
personal computers and other one-way information retrieval devices is
muted by Orwellian privacy implications of hooking personal com-
puters to large mainframe computers by telecommunications links. It
would be only a small step from this to two-way information retrieval
systems enabling governments or other institutions to retrieve private
information about individual users. Finally, controversy persists over
the possible health hazards of low-level radiation produced by video
display terminals.9" These are only a few of the problems which will
have to be solved if the information age can be controlled to serve
individuals.
The development of these information technologies present the
information about legislation, member scheduling, House and Senate floor activity, and the
United Press International file, and has electronic mail capacity.
95 Within weeks of the installation in 1983 of the VT 102 system in the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, the staff of the Subcommittee on International Operations, then chaired by the
Hon. Dante Fascell, produced in one week a complex conference document used by House and
Senate conferees in their deliberations on H.R. 2915, the State Department authorization bill for
the 1984-85 fiscal year (now Pub. L. No. 98-164, infra note 99). Without a computer, it would
have taken a minimum of three weeks to produce such a document.
96 Privacy protection laws generally "include provisions that, though by different means, re-
quire the user to disclose either general or specific information to the data subject, e.g., where
personal information is being processed, where the user obtained the information, and where the
user will send the information." Burkert, Institutions of Data Protection--An A ttempt at a Func-
tional Explanation ofEuropean NationalData Protection Laws, 3 CoMPtrER/LJ. 167, 173 (1981).
The extent of privacy protection in the United States, however, is not as comprehensive as in other
nations. Eger, supra note 18, at 211. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 522a (1982)), only "protect[s] the
privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies." Id at
§ 2.
97 Novotny, supra note I, at 116. This raises complex compliance problems: Not only must
the corporation decide what information is protected, but it also must decide which jurisdiction's
laws apply. Id at 115-16.
98 Compare Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 3 (pregnancy problems discovered in group of
United Airlines workers using VDTs) with Boffey, PVdeo Tenninals Harmless to Eye, Study As-
serts, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1983, at Cl, col. 1 (no scientific evidence that VDTs cause permanent
damage to eyes or increase risk of cataracts).
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knottiest problems of all. As information becomes easily available,
what constraints are desirable? Who controls what information goes
into the system? Who decides what uses of the system are permissible?
At the core of the information revolution is an age-old battle: Should
individual freedom or governmental regulation be the guiding princi-
ple of public policy? The advent of the information age moves that
battle to a new, higher plane with enormous stakes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout this Perspective, questions have been raised about the
relationships among the various components of the information age.
International finance, news gathering, education, telecommunications
services, international trade, development assistance and national se-
curity are no longer discrete issues. Decisions concerning satellite com-
munications affect banking, trade, aid, intelligence-gathering, the news
media, national defense, and diplomacy. Regulation of transborder
data flows affects everything from the conduct of an individual's life to
government decisionmaking to the worldwide conduct of business.
Changes in information technologies must be considered by the OECD
when discussing privacy protections, by UNESCO when discussing
controls on the news media, or by the ITU when discussing frequency
allocations. The merger of computer and communications technolo-
gies, the development of digital communications techniques, and new
forms of network integration have created new mobility for vast
amounts of data. Advances in these fields are drastically reducing bar-
riers of time and distance.
International communications and information policy issues are so
deeply interrelated that the usual governmental practice of compart-
mentalizing these issues will be counter-productive, even dangerous, to
United States interests. Furthermore, the development of information
technologies is so rapid that normal governmental procedures never
quite control events or issues. It is therefore critical for the United
States to formulate a policy which is broad and flexible, and which
addresses seemingly disparate, but related, problem areas. If the
United States is to respond effectively to the challenges of the informa-
tion age, it must seek a coherent response-not a babble of dissonant
voices representing interests at odds with or unaware of one another.
In an attempt to institute the policymaking and policy-executing
machinery to draw information age participants together, the State De-
partment has set up an Office of the Coordinator for International
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Communications and Information Policy.99 The purpose of this office
is to monitor all issues, draw government and private sector partici-
pants together for information exchange and action, act as a clearing-
house, and, most importantly, guide decisionmaking. Through this
office the expertise of all participants can be brought together and syn-
thesized into a coherent policy. The State Department was not chosen
for this task by accident: The essentially international character of
communications and information issues ultimately requires foreign
policy decisionmaking capacity.c °
By developing complementary policies which, taken together, con-
stitute the United States' policy for international communications and
information, the State Department can turn the diversity of American
society to foreign policy advantage and permit the information age par-
ticipants to pursue their areas of expertise. Such an international pol-
icy must ensure that each participant knows what the others are doing
and must be able to effect compromise when participants proceed in
contradictory or counterproductive directions. This policy must enable
the United States government to forge an aggressive working partner-
ship with private industry to ensure the United States' competitive
place in the world. The process will not be easy, but it is necessary if
the United States is to survive and grow, and to preserve its democratic
ideals.
99 For a full discussion of this position and its creation, see H.R. REP. No. 100, pt. 2, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Hearings on H.. 1957 Before the Subcommn on International Operations
and the Subcomna on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign
4ffairs, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). For a discussion of the subsequent legislation codifying this
office, Pub. L. No. 98-164, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (97 Stat.) 1017, 1025-26, see also
H.R. REP. No. 130, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-55 (1983).
100 See H.R. REP. No. 130, supra note 99, at 50. The Coordinator, a presidential appointee
with the rank of ambassador, serves as a liaison between State Department offices and bureaus,
other executive branch agencies, congressional committees, and the private sector. Id at 50-5 1.
